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STATE OF NEW YORK- l30ARD OF PARO LE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Tuszynski, David Facility: Cayuga CF 
NYSID: 
DIN: 08-B-0403 
Appearances: Ryan Muldoon Esq. 
WHMBP.C. 
11 Court Street 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Auburn, New York 13021 
09-027-18 B 
Decision appealed: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months.. 
Board Member(s) Coppola, Demosthenes 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received January 2, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release D~cision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
---Z...4-.____,,,.__ ~ffirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
;-: / --·. 
---N~~7'17--J?i;iq:::& ·~~~med _Vacated, remanded for de ~ovo interview _Modified ~o ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Detertn!nation, the rel~ted Statement of the Appeals Unit's Finding~ and the se~~)ate jindings ~; 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any,. on Y1 J{/}1 £6 . 
r I 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Tuszynski, David DIN: 08-B-0403  
Facility: Cayuga CF AC No.:  09-027-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 1 of 3) 
 
    Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 24-month hold. The appellant is serving a prison sentence of 7-20  years. His final convictions 
were for 40 counts of Criminal Sexual Act 2nd Degree, 52 counts of Incest, and 12 counts of Rape 
2nd Degree.  
Appellant alleges the following: 1) the Board decision failed to consider and/or properly weigh the 
required statutory factors. Appellant contends he has an excellent institutional record and release 
plan, but all the Board did was to look only at the instant offenses. 2) no aggravating factors exist. 
3) the Board ignored the presumption created by his EEC. 4) the Board ignored his COMPAS. 
 
   Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.”  Correction Law 805.  accord Matter of Bello 
v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017). Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, 
but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While 
consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). 
 
     There is no requirement in the law that the board place equal or greater emphasis on petitioner's 
present commendable conduct than on the gravity of his offense.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 133, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983). The record 
reflects that the Board took into consideration the relevant factors, including….  The Board was 
not required to give each factor equal weight and could place greater emphasis on the gravity of 
the inmate’s offense.  Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d 
Dept. 2018); Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 
235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of Furman v. Annucci, 138 A.D.3d 1269, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). 
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     The Board “properly took into account the extremely serious nature of petitioner's crimes, 
which was not outweighed by his apparently exemplary record of accomplishments while 
incarcerated.”  Matter of Anthony v. New York State Div. of Parole, 17 A.D.3d 301, 301, 792 
N.Y.S.2d 900, 900 (1st Dept. 2005)  lv. denied, 5 N.Y.3d 708, 803 N.Y.S.2d 28 (2005). “The Parole 
Board’s determination denying petitioner parole was rationally based on the seriousness of 
petitioner’s crimes.”  People ex rel. Watson v. Hollins, 302 A.D.2d 279, 280, 753 N.Y.S.2d 841 
(1st Dept. 2003). 
 
   The Board could cite the deviant  nature of the offense. Matter of Wellman v. Dennison, 23 
A.D.3d 974, 975, 805 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (3d Dept. 2005). 
 
     The Board may cite the failure of the inmate to acknowledge the impact of the criminal conduct 
on the victim. Gaito v New York State Board of Parole, 238 A.D.2d 634, 655 N.Y.S.2d 692 (3d Dept 
1997);  Romer v Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872 (3d Dept. 2005). 
    The Board was not required to give each factor equal weight or explicitly discuss each factor 
and was entitled to, and properly did, place greater emphasis upon the egregious and protracted 
nature of petitioner’s crimes involving sex offenses against a female relative and his lack of insight.  
Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 
2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017). 
 
      The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     Receipt of an EEC does not preclude denial of parole.  Matter of Milling v. Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 
1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 
(2006); Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (3d Dept. 
2005); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 
(3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001). An EEC does not 
automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate consideration of the statutory 
factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 
A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. 
Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).  Moreover, the Board is not 
required to give each factor equal weight.  Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 
817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817.  The Board may deny release 
to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the 
inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not 
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compatible with the welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. 
Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 
176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). Appellant’s receipt of an EEC did not preclude the Board from considering 
and placing greater emphasis on the serious nature of his crime.  See, e.g., Matter of Beodeker v. 
Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Furman v. Annucci, 138 
A.D.3d 1269, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Feilzer v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 131 A.D.3d 1321, 1322, 16 N.Y.S.3d 341, 341 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 
183 A.D.2d 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dept. 1992). 
     There is no merit to Appellant’s claim that a favorable COMPAS instrument gives rise to a 
presumption of rehabilitation and release.  Since 1977, the Board has been required to apply the 
same three-part substantive standard. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  The 2011 amendments 
require the Board to incorporate risk and needs assessment principles to “assist” in measuring an 
inmate’s rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon release.  Executive Law § 259-c(4).  The 
statute thus does not clearly create a presumption of rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and 
needs assessment, let alone a presumption of parole release requiring the Board to provide 
countervailing evidence.  Indeed, while the Board might, for example, find an inmate sufficiently 
rehabilitated to satisfy the first prong of the standard—that the inmate will “live and remain at 
liberty without violating the law,” the Board could also find, in its discretion, as it did here, that 
the inmate’s release would be incompatible with the welfare of society or would unduly deprecate 
the seriousness of a crime. The text of the statute therefore flatly contradicts the inmate’s assertion 
that even uniformly low COMPAS scores create a presumption of release. See Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397. The COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must 
weigh along with the statutory factors for purposes of deciding whether the two standards are 
satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1108; accord Matter of 
Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d at 1061. This is exactly what occurred here.  The Board is not 
required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory factors.  Matter 
of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); accord Matter of 
Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
     In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
